Introduction
I’ve written before about the ICC’s analysis of decomposition, mainly because I realised it was key to understanding the resolutions of the 23rd Congress and the ICC’s conclusion that its position on the historic course was no longer valid but I also wanted to better understand how this analysis fits with the Marxist position on decadence in the light of the charges by other groups of the Communist Left like the ICT that it is essentially outside of Marxism.
I concluded that, far from being ‘un-Marxist’, the basic concept of decomposition simply describes the decay of the superstructure of capitalist society and that to reject it throws into question the Marxist position on the inevitable decay of modes of production.
But, given that I was critical of the 23rd Congress resolutions and that I find the ICC’s concept of the historic course problematic, are there also issues and problems with its analysis of decomposition?
The ICC’s analysis is based on the specific argument that decadent capitalism entered into a new and final phase in the 1980s as a result not only of the qualitative deepening of decay but also the inability of either class to impose its own ‘solution’ to the capitalist crisis - world war or world revolution.
In other words, simply: decomposition = decay + stalemate.
So any critique of decomposition needs to consider the validity of both these aspects.
This text will deal with issues and problems related to decay and a future one will take up the analysis of a ‘social stalemate’.
The key texts referred to here are the original Theses on Decomposition published in IR 62 (1990) and republished in IR 107 (2001); a further article dealing with the Marxist roots of the concept in IR 117 (2004) and the Report on decomposition today from the 22nd Congress (2017), published online in 2019.
1. Is the bourgeoisie capable of offering a perspective for society today?
Let’s start with what seems to me to be the least convincing argument in in the ICC’s original Theses; that in the phase of decomposition the bourgeoisie is “not able … to put forward the slightest perspective of its own, even in the short term” (my emphasis). Whereas in the 1930s the bourgeoisie was able to organise society’s productive, political, and ideological apparatus around a perspective, however murderous and suicidal even, today “the bourgeoisie is totally incapable of mobilising society’s different components, including within the ruling class, around any common objective other than a step by step, but doomed, resistance to the advancing crisis”. Of course the ICC emphasises that none of these perspectives offered any kind of “solution” to the contradictions of capitalism, but for the bourgeoisie they had the advantage of containing a ‘realistic’ objective like the need to mobilise society for war.
The theoretical basis for this whole argument is that “no mode of production can live, develop, maintain itself on a viable basis and ensure social cohesion, if it is unable to present a perspective for the whole of the society which it dominates. And this is especially true of capitalism, which is the most dynamic mode of production in history” (Thesis 5).
First, I don’t think this sounds right; surely it is the other way round - it is precisely because of the unique dynamism of the capitalist mode of production that it is less essential for the ruling class to present a perspective for the society it dominates? This is why the Decadence pamphlet points to the lesser importance of ideological relations in capitalism: “Under the system of wage labour and capital there is no religious, political or personal relation to mediate the relations of exploitation (contrary to those which were produced under slavery and serfdom). A much more direct link between social life and economic life proper emerges”.
Second, the argument that “no mode of production can live, develop, maintain itself on a viable basis and ensure social cohesion, if it is unable to present a perspective for the whole of the society which it dominates” is true of the entire period of decadence. On the face of it the change since the end of the 1980s is obvious; the bourgeoisie is no longer able to mobilise society around the common objective of defending itself against the rival bloc, ie. in defence of the values of the ‘free world’ against ‘communism’, or the ‘defence of socialism’ against fascism, etc. But again this has to be seen in the overall context of decadence.
The decomposition of bourgeois ideology is the first symptom of capitalist decadence and the Decadence pamphlet vividly describes the horrors of the 20th century, with its world wars and 100 million people killed, the atrocities of Nazism, Stalinism and the democratic allies, etc., which inevitably took their toll on the ability of bourgeois society to offer any convincing perspective to humanity. In this context, the acceleration of ideological decomposition with the resurgence of class struggle after May ‘68, especially among youth, came late, highlighting the lag between such developments and socio-economic reality.
So while the ICC is absolutely right to point to the inevitable effects of capitalist decay at the level of bourgeois ideology, I think it is not sufficiently precise about the change which takes place after the collapse of the blocs. And is simplistic in talking of a complete inability of the bourgeoisie to put forward any perspective even in the short term; this may be true in those regions of capitalism where decay is most advanced (Africa, parts of Latin America) but in the heartlands of capitalism along with the still relatively dynamic economies of Eastern Asia the bourgeoisie is still capable of putting forward ‘realistic’ objectives at least at the level of individual national capitals – even if they are based on cynical lies and nationalist propaganda. In fact we are seeing a strengthening of nationalist ideology today, which should not surprise us given that patriotism is in many ways the final bastion of bourgeois ideology.
The attenuation of decomposition and the “seductive perfume of "modernity””
This brings us on to the question of the attenuation of decomposition. Specifically, are there counter-tendencies which can help us to explain the appearance of sometimes dazzling development, for example in China, even in the supposedly terminal phase of capitalism’s decadence?
This question was not addressed in the original Theses, which predated China’s spectacular growth. 25 years later a report on decomposition to the 22nd ICC Congress did take it up, in a section dealing with “The general difficulty in recognising the existence of decomposition”, which identifies the development of state capitalism in the most advanced countries together with the fact that capitalism is the most dynamic mode of production in history.
The report quotes the well-known statement from the Communist Manifesto that "the bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, which means the relations of production, that is to say the whole of social relations”. But instead of pursuing this line of argument to explain how the phenomenon of growth in East Asia fits with the analysis of decomposition, it simply concludes that due to capital’s dynamism, decomposition does not occur uniformly in all countries; it is more attenuated in China and other Asian countries and this tends to "hide" decomposition, so that “One might say that the nauseating odour it produces is diminished by the seductive perfume of "modernity””.
Let’s just remind ourselves what we are talking about here:
“…In 25 years of economic crisis and ‘globalisation' (1980-2005), Europe has increased its GDP (Gross Domestic Product) by a factor of just 1.7, the United States by 2.2 and the world by 2.5. India, on the other hand, has managed to increase it four-fold, developing Asia six-fold and China ten-fold. This means that the latter has developed 4 times more rapidly than the international average and it has done so during a period of crisis (…) It took the United States fifty years to double its per capita income between 1865 and the First World War (1914): China has managed to do so in half the time and in the midst of the decadent period and the capitalist crisis (…)The transformation of the employment structure is one of the fastest ever to have taken place in the history of capitalism (…) The development of China's GDP is also the most dramatic in the entire history of capitalism.” (ICC, 2008)
So I think we are talking about something a bit more substantial than an aroma. The dramatic development described above actually coincides with the entry of capitalism into its terminal phase of decadence, according to the ICC, but was the dramatic growth of the East Asian economies in the 1990s the result of the collapse of the blocs, or was it more complicated than that: the effects of the economic crisis, which forced India and China to abandon their respective Stalinist and nationalist models of state capitalism, together with the development of ‘globalisation’ and the search of the developed capitalist economies for a low-cost workforce? To date, despite some serious research, the ICC has not been able to present an organisational position on this question.
Of course, despite all their signs of dynamic growth, the East Asian countries are in no way exempt from capitalist decay; just as capitalism enters into its phase of decadence as a global system rather than on a regional or national basis, so the qualitative development of its decay must inevitably affect the entire process of capitalist accumulation. But a coherent explanation of this phenomenon, and of other signs of the capacity of capitalism for dynamic growth, needs to be integrated into our overall understanding of decadence in order to better understand the factors attenuating the acceleration of capitalism’s decay in this period.
Capital’s dynamism is at the root of its decay
The starting point for the ICC’s analysis of decomposition is the clear recognition that capitalism is the most dynamic mode of production in history (Thesis 5). It is this dynamism that lies at the root of capitalism’s transitory nature; its only purpose is its own self-expansion but in pursuit of this it confronts the barrier of its own relations of production, eventually reaching the point where these become a definitive fetter on the further development of the productive forces. But this dynamism does not halt with capitalism’s decadence, which is characterised not by long-term stagnation or a collapse of production like previous class societies but “bitter contradictions, crises, spasms”, together with “the violent destruction of capital” which for Marx is “the most striking form in which advice is given it to be gone and to give room to a higher state of social production”.
For the ICC it is this dynamism - the extraordinary speed with which capitalism transforms society and of the accumulation of contradictions this has produced - which results in the phase of Decomposition (Thesis 3). But the report to the 22nd Congress identifies this same dynamism as an attenuating or counter-tendency which makes it difficult to recognise the existence of decomposition. If this is true - that capital's own dynamism acts as an attenuating factor on the process of its decay - then we need to fully explore the implications of this.
It is capitalism’s dynamism that is absolutely key to an understanding of this whole question.
Capital’s imperative to expand itself without limit in its phase of decadence results in a qualitative development of all the destructive tendencies that are inherent in capital’s mode of operation, including the expulsion of living labour from the production process, the severing of the connection between human beings and nature, and the long term despoiling of nature itself.
The way the ICC describes decomposition is that “Capitalism is rotting on its feet” but a better image would be the slow-motion wreck of a high-speed train…
"The seductive perfume of "modernity"": Chinese 350kph high speed train
The ICC’s designation of decomposition (or ‘Decomposition’) as “a new and final phase” of capitalism’s decadence also encourages the idea that every phenomenon of capitalist society today is an expression of decomposition. But this is not the case, as we can illustrate again with the example of China. If we take some of the obvious consequences of this development – rural depopulation, overcrowding, appalling levels of pollution, sophisticated state surveillance, terror and repression – these are not in themselves symptoms of the decay of the superstructure of capitalist society but rather the product of all the destructive tendencies inherent in a uniquely dynamic mode of production which entered into its phase of decadence over 100 years ago.
Conclusions
The ICC’s theory of decomposition is an analysis of the implications of the period opened up by the collapse of the USSR and the disintegration of the blocs, which is characterised by the acceleration and qualitative deepening of the decay of capitalist society. As such, it is rooted in a defence of the Marxist position on capitalist decadence.
But we can also see in the ICC’s analysis of the implications of decomposition some issues which stem from difficulties in developing its understanding of decadence, especially since the 1990s. In particular:
1. The ICC’s argument that this period is characterised by “the bourgeoisie’s inability to offer the slightest perspective for society as a whole” is simplistic and needs to be placed in a broader and deeper historical analysis of the role of ideology in capitalism and the decomposition of bourgeois ideology in the epoch of capitalist decadence.
2. Despite 25 years of decomposition, the ICC has not been able to integrate an analysis of the spectacular development of China into its understanding of decadence, which leads it to the weak conclusion that decomposition is simply more attenuated in China and other Asian countries.
3. More fundamentally, despite recognising that decomposition is an expression of the unique dynamism of the capitalist mode of production, the ICC has not been able to fully develop this recognition into its understanding of the continued appearance of ‘growth’ in this period alongside the symptoms of accelerated decay.
These difficulties correspond closely to key weaknesses identified by the ICC itself in the balance sheet of its activities at its 21st Congress, which included:
- a reductionist and schematic understanding of the economic theory of Rosa Luxemburg leading to a “catastrophist” vision of decadence as a potential collapse of the system
- a tendency to deny any possibility of capitalism’s expansion in its decadent period and consequent difficulties in understanding the development of China and other peripheral countries after the collapse of the Eastern bloc
- an underestimation of the bourgeoisie’s ability to prolong the survival of its system.
Despite identifying these weaknesses, we have seen no convincing signs in public that the ICC has been able to address them. On the contrary, in the delayed or non-appearance of key texts from the 22nd Congress, and in the confusions and contradictions in the reports and solutions of the 23rd Congress, there are signs of continuing difficulties. The internal debate on the causes of the post-war boom held over 10 years ago, and which clearly opened up deeper issues about understanding the potential for expansion in decadence, has never been concluded, and the ICC’s Decadence pamphlet, which makes no mention of China, has not been updated since the entry of capitalism, according to the ICC’s own analysis, into its final phase of decomposition. These weaknesses inevitably continue to undermine the strength of its analysis of the decay of capitalist society.
Issues and problems in the ICC’s analysis of a ‘social stalemate’ since 1989 will be taken up in a separate text before drawing some general conclusions about ‘decomposition’.
MH
January 2020